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ABSTRACT1  
We argue that regulation can improve the performance of 
conventional banks up to a limit, but cannot eliminate the 
deficiencies resulting from the use of the conventional loan 
contract.  
Islamic finance requires complicated and costly 
procedures compared to conventional finance. Yet, it has 
significant macroeconomic benefits, which cannot be 
internalized by individual banks. Therefore, Islamic 
bankers tend to mimic conventional finance in order to cut 
costs and maximize short-term profits. Regulation can 
modify bankers’ incentives in order to capture the benefits 
of Islamic finance. 
Based on Al-Jarhi’s macroeconomic model (1983), we 
construct an economic theory of Islamic banking 
regulation. Results point out to the potential of designing 
regulations that discourage mimicking conventional 
finance in order to benefit from the Islamic finance 
advantages. 
 
Key words: Al-Jarhi’s model, Islamic banking, Islamic 
finance, monetary economics, financial economics, 
banking, banking regulation, banking supervision, Islamic 
                                                 
1 An earlier version was published in the Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance. This 
version includes significant changes. The author is currently a professor of economics and 
finance at the International Center for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF), Kuala Lumpur. 
The author is indebted to his MA students in the class of Legal and Supervisory Issues in 
Islamic Finance (Fall 2013/14), Hamad Bin Khalifa University, for transcribing some of the 
lecture notes related to the topic, and to his colleagues in INCEIF for helpful comments. 
Opinions expressed herein are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of INCEIF. 
Readers unfamiliar with Islamic finance are well advised to start with reading the three 
appendices provided at the end of the paper.   
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economics, financial economics, finance, financial 
intermediaries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The economic theory of bank regulation can be considered 
as a part of the whole theory of regulation. The latter 
theory can take a normative approach, where regulation is 
justified by market failure or a positive approach where 
regulation is a result of the interaction between 
government bodies, banking and financial institutions as 
well as the active parties in the political process (Hebbink 
and Prast, 1998). Arguments of this approach are usually 
presented under the title of government failure. This paper 
attempts to complete the economic theory of bank 
regulation by covering the missing part related to Islamic 
finance.  
Since Islamic finance has special characteristics that 
influence the extent of information asymmetry and 
introduces new questions related to monitoring, we expect 
the regulation theory related to conventional finance to be 
influenced. Some modifications would have to be 
ultimately introduced. While we focus on regulating 
Islamic banks, we try to point out some of the 
modifications required on the conventional banking side.  
The economic theory of bank regulation attempts to 
explain why banks should be regulated and how. The 
theory provides two alternative justifications for bank 
regulation: government failures and market failures. While 
both types of failure seem to have some role, some 
economists, e. g., Heremans (2000) believe that market 
failures are becoming the dominant rationale for banking 
regulation 2 . Conventional finance, being based on the 
classical loan contract exposes financial intermediaries to 
information asymmetry. In addition, the banking industry 
                                                 
2 One way to explain this is to look into the increasing role of pressure groups in Western 
democracies, which is not sufficiently counterbalanced by the effectiveness of government 
branches. 
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gravitates towards large-size banks. This has started the 
controversy whether regulations should focus on 
protecting such banks from failure or protecting finance 
users from insolvency or bankruptcy.  
Islamic finance introduces a different twist to the story of 
regulation. It is not supposed to use the classical loan 
contract. Instead, there are sixteen financing contracts 
available some of which would be subject to information 
asymmetry and others would not. An Islamic financial 
intermediary would mix and match such contracts in 
order to structure the financing it provides to customers. 
In addition, Islamic finance seem to provide 
macroeconomic benefits to the economy 3 . Since such 
benefits cannot be internalized, and since Islamic finance 
requires costlier and more roundabout methods to mix 
and match financing contracts, Islamic bankers find it 
more profitable to mimic conventional finance. Regulating 
Islamic banks must therefore be directed to establishing 
proper incentives to follow the true Islamic finance 
paradigm in order to benefit from its significant 
externalities. This is the core objective of our theory. In 
addition, such regulation must provide sufficient 
safeguards against information asymmetry and the 
exposure of Islamic banks to its resulting risking  
The paper is organized in six parts.  The first section starts 
by explaining the nature of an Islamic bank and whether 
they, like their conventional counterparts, emerged 
endogenously. The paper then explains why Islamic banks 
find it beneficial to mimic conventional banks. The second 
section discusses market imperfections in relation to 
Islamic finance, including screening, monitoring and 
liquidity risk. The third section discusses the incentives to 
monitor as related to asset safety. The forth section 
                                                 
3 See Appendix II. 
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discusses the relationship between market failures and 
regulation. Section five discusses some related issues of 
monetary policy.  Issues of aggregate liquidity related to 
the proposed set of regulations are discussed in the last 
section. Finally, the paper summarizes its conclusions. 
SECTION II: MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND 
REGULATION 
Four alternative theories have developed to explain why 
banks exist in response to financial market imperfections 
(Freixas and Santomero, 2002). Let us consider the 
implications of each for Islamic banking.  
I. SCREENING OF POTENTIAL BORROWERS 
Conventional banks screen potential clients ex ante on 
behalf of depositors), either because they are better at 
screening (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), or they do it on 
behalf of a large number of interested parties (Campbell 
and Kracaw, 1980). In both cases, banks enjoy economies 
of scale in monitoring (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1983). 
However, the presence of economies of scale does not 
automatically lead to conventional banks actually 
monitoring their customers. Since monitoring is costly, 
conventional banks try to avoid it by requiring borrowers 
to provide collateral and guarantees. This happens to be 
the general trend in conventional banking. Banks prefer 
to take risk on collateral rather than sharing in the 
business risk of their customers.  
In addition, monitoring would be generally restricted to 
large-volume transactions, where structured finance can 
be used. When a conventional bank finances a huge 
industrial or construction operation, it may find it 
economical to attach to it a system of monitoring. 
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However, the majority of lending activities would not take 
such huge amounts of finance. In addition, borrowers with 
large financial requirements often find it to their 
advantage to resort to issuing bonds in financial markets 
in order to avoid monitoring, whose costs would be 
included in higher borrowing rates. That may explain the 
growth in issuing corporate bonds. 
In Islamic finance, there is a need as well as an incentive 
for Islamic banks to screen finance users. 
In financing consumption, consumers “compete” for the 
commodities by expressing their willingness to purchase 
each at a price or a markup over cost that is 
commensurate with their marginal value in use as well as 
their time preference related to each commodity 4 . 
Competition would result in an equilibrium that equates 
the price of each with its marginal value in use. In 
addition, commodities are financed through their sale 
against future payment or their future delivery against 
spot payment. Screening would therefore depend on the 
bidding by each customer in addition to the ability of each 
commodity financed to serve as collateral. 
The issue of how much finance to allocate to each 
commodity is resolved through a process that invokes its 
value in use as well as the commodity time preference. 
Both Islamic and conventional finance benefit from the 
existence of economies of scale in screening consumers 
seeking finance. Islamic banks would also have a 
comparative advantage in screening sale finance 
customers than conventional banks in screening 
borrowers because of the virtually non-existence of 
                                                 
4 When present money is lent against future money, time preference in money becomes 
central. When goods are delivered against future payments, or present payments are made 
against future delivery of goods in Islamic finance, time preference would be related to the 
goods and not to cash balances. The implication is that different goods would command 
different markups, depending on their rates of time preference. Such markups would be 
equated at the margin under perfect competition.  
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information asymmetry in the case of five out of six Islamic 
sale finance contracts. 
Regulation must therefore be directed to establishing 
procedures for Islamic sale finance that would provide for 
the proper use the financed commodities as collateral until 
full repayment is concluded. When commodities cannot 
serve as collateral, because they are either perishable or 
with high cost of repossession, additional regulations 
must be set. This would include procedures for penalizing 
delinquency and verifying temporary insolvency. 
As to Salam finance, the agricultural commodities 
designated for future delivery cannot be used as collateral. 
The ability of the finance user to deliver such commodities 
depends on how their price received in advance is used 
towards cultivating them. Information asymmetry is 
therefore associated with such contract. The bank 
purchasing goods through Salam needs to ascertain that 
the use of the advanced funds will lead to producing 
sufficient quantities to be delivered.  
Screening investors is a process that goes beyond the 
verification of the ability to pay. Investors, whether they 
obtain finance through sale, or partnership (in product or 
profit), must prove the feasibility of their investment, 
because it influences their ability to recover the finance 
they obtain. In this respect, regulation of Islamic banks 
must ascertain that they are properly equipped with the 
abilities to prepare, review feasibility studies, and monitor 
investments made through Mudaraba and Wakala 
(investment agency). Monitoring would be done 
automatically with partnership in product and profit, 
because in both cases, Islamic banks participate in 
management and have direct access to investors 
information.   
II.  MONITORING BANKS AND CUSTOMERS 
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Banking theory focuses on the monitoring of borrowers’ 
actions after loan approval. Models here have 
concentrated on one of the following (Freixas and 
Santomero, 2002).  
1.- The actual use of borrowed funds (Boot and Thakor, 
1993),  
2.- Effort involved (Allen and Gale, 1988), and  
3.- Ex post outcome revelation (Diamond, 1984, Gale and 
Hellwig, 1985). 
In this context, Islamic finance monitoring of finance 
users’ actions during the use of finance takes a different 
form. In partnership finance, an Islamic bank or financial 
institution, in its capacity as partner, is a part of the 
management 5 ; information flows automatically into its 
hands. Regulations must therefore stipulate that the 
Islamic bank must ascertain that the finance user is 
properly equipped to collect and disseminate all necessary 
information. 
In sale finance, an Islamic bank or finance institution 
would provide commodities, not cash, to finance users. 
Therefore, there is no need to worry about how funds are 
used. What remains is that the financier must ascertain 
through maintenance and insurance contracts that the 
use of commodities provided would not be contrary to their 
ability to be used as collateral 6 . Regulations must 
therefore provide rules against obtaining finance for 
commodities that would be automatically resold to others. 
Commodities, which cannot be used as collateral, because 
                                                 
5 That means membership in boards of directors of financed companies. The amount of 
partnership finance would be set by an Islamic bank in order to reduce the cost of monitoring 
to minimum. In other words, the share of the bank in the company should be large enough 
to afford it membership in the board of directors and continuous flow of information. 
6 Consequently, an Islamic financial institution has direct interest in refusing to finance 
commodities for those who obtain finance for liquidity purposes, i.e., purchase goods for 
immediate resale, or Tawarruq. The ability of financed goods to serve as collateral would 
significantly diminish under such behavior. 
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of their nature, should be given special treatment, like 
requiring guarantees or suitable collateral. 
In contrast, Salam finance presents a need to monitor how 
the fund user utilizes the funds in order to finance the 
production of a sufficient amount of product for future 
delivery. This type of finance is marred with serious 
information asymmetry which must be confronted with 
either matching it with partnership finance or imposing 
special procedures to facilitate inexpensive monitoring7. 
The rules listed below for PLS and Wakala finance must 
therefore apply to Salam. 
The question of how customers use funds after obtaining 
finance arises also in the cases of Amana or trust finance, 
which includes Mudaraba (profit-and-loss sharing, PLS) 
and investment Wakala (agency investment), both 
unrestricted and restricted. Therefore, it becomes 
necessary for Rabbulmal (fund owner) to insure against 
encroachment, negligence and violation of contract. 
Towards that end, regulations can set suitable guidelines 
for Amana finance (Mudaraba and Wakala) as well as 
Salam, including the following. 
1. Making feasibility studies to estimate the expected or 
indicative rate of return, by whose figures and results 
the finance users must be bound, except for changes 
that occur for reasons beyond their power. In such case, 
the burden of proof falls squarely on the shoulders of 
the finance users. 
2. The investment agent, Mudareb, managing partner, or 
Wakeel (investment agent) must hold orderly 
bookkeeping and supply audited financial statements 
                                                 
7 The need to exercise monitoring with Salam finance could be ignored because the contract 
does not stipulate the delivery of the goods to be cultivated, horticulture or even 
manufactured, but goods to be delivered must be chosen to be easily available in the market 
which the fund user can acquire and deliver. However, we think that the contract has been 
originally developed as a means to finance production of goods to be delivered.  
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regularly (monthly or quarterly) containing the 
information necessary for proper monitoring. 
3. Control of payables and receivables of financed 
operation must be done through an account with the 
bank or finance institution, where all outward 
movements would be approved by both the financier 
and the finance user. 
4. To avoid such costly procedures, PLS, Wakala and 
Salam could be joined with Musharaka or partnership 
finance, where the bank is continuously informed about 
business developments in the financed company. 
Regulations should therefore accept that, as a 
substitute for the above procedure. 
When it comes to monitoring banks by customers, we find 
that the incentive to monitor one’s bank is rather week in 
conventional banking. This is because all deposits are 
presumed to be guaranteed under the classical loan 
contract, both principal and interest. Obviously, such 
guarantee is valuable only to the extent of which the 
occurrence of bank failures is not possible and deposits 
are insured.  
Perhaps, monetary economists assume that since deposit 
insurance usually covers small-size deposits, those with 
large deposits can afford monitoring their banks. However, 
this still does not explain how this monitoring would be 
done. Besides, the mere dependence on the follow up of 
published financial statements and other data about the 
bank is not sufficient for effective monitoring. The 
question of how customers of conventional banks monitor 
their banks effectively remains to be answered. 
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In Islamic banks, investment accounts are held under the 
rules of PLS8 and are not guaranteed9. Finance providers 
in this case are far less informed than finance users. 
Because of information asymmetry, they face the risk of 
moral hazard whose reduction requires monitoring. 
Investment account holders would have a strong incentive 
to monitor Islamic banks, but have no effective way to 
doing so. Regulation may fill out this gap by providing 
access to investment account holder to monitoring Islamic 
banks through enforcing a governance rule that appoints 
some of the holders with highest investment-account 
balances as members of the board of directors.  
The rationale for such representation is that investment 
accounts face the same risks as shareholding in the bank.  
How much representation should be accorded to them? 
Proportional representation would make account holders 
a majority in banks’ boards of directors. Meanwhile, 
considering that some of these accounts are transitory, 
regulations can set a criterion that considers both account 
size and maturity for the eligibility to sit on the board.  
Obviously, with most investment accounts maturing at 
the end of the financial year, holders of investment 
accounts can become a majority in the Board of Directors. 
A new type of a banking establishment, managed by 
“depositors” could arise. Islamic banking would be 
radically changing its institutional structure and moving 
further away from conventional finance. 
                                                 
8  Some also can be held under Musharaka and Wakala, which would equally require 
monitoring. 
9  In some developing countries, all deposits are guaranteed by the government. This 
introduces an element of moral hazard in banking, balanced by the power of monetary 
authorities to monitor banks through regulation and supervision. The monetary authorities 
would monitor banks on behalf of customers, hence. Sometimes, the monetary authority 
limits the risk each bank is allowed to take. This would introduce an element of inefficiency 
in the banking sector. 
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III. LIQUIDITY RISK INSURANCE & MATURITY 
MISMATCH 
The justification of providing guaranteed deposits, offered 
by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), assumes uncertainty of 
consumption timing. Conventional banking contracts 
allow for some ex ante insurance. Despite the possible 
instability of conventional banks, their guaranteed deposit 
contracts are preferred to financial securities (McCulloch, 
1986). 
The provision of guaranteed, instead of PLS deposits 
returns the financial system to the prisoners’ dilemma. If 
all holders of “investable balances” were to be provided 
with guaranteed deposits, risk would be borne by only one 
side of the financial system, namely, fund users. Lack of 
coordination would deprive the system from the 
compactness associated with system-wide risk sharing, 
whose benefits would outweigh the private benefits 
accruing to each individual depositor.   
Both conventional and Islamic banks mobilize resources 
which are mostly short-term through accepting deposits 
or investment accounts. Yet, they require longer-term 
funds in order to provide loans to conventional bank 
customers and make profitable investments by Islamic 
banks. Maturity mismatch is therefore a common hazard 
of the banking industry. 
Regulations attempt to protect conventional banks from 
maturity mismatch through ascertaining that each has a 
viable system of liquidity management that assigns to 
each future payment to be made, a matching sufficient 
inflow that cover it over the short- and medium-term. This 
can also be done in the case of Islamic banks. 
Another means is to securitize investment accounts by 
issuing investment certificates of long maturities that can 
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be sold by their holders before maturity. This adds 
liquidity and flexibility to investment accounts, similar to 
certificates of deposits in conventional finance.  
A third means is to finance long-term projects through 
Sukuk. The sale of Sukuk would bring in sufficient 
proceeds to finance the project. In addition, Sukuk would 
be tradable, which affords their holders a good measure of 
both liquidity and return. 
Islamic banks do accept demand deposits like 
conventional banks. Their assets, too, have longer 
maturity than their demand deposits and investment 
accounts. However, they have more tools to use in bridging 
the maturity gap than do conventional finance. In 
particular, they can apply the following methods: 
1. The use of restricted investment accounts, based on 
restricted PLS or Wakala, to attract funds directed to 
financing certain projects or portfolios with maturities 
longer than available through unrestricted investment 
accounts. This enables Islamic bank to earmark the 
proceeds of some restricted investment accounts to 
certain long term investments. It would be an effective 
means to mobilize funds with maturities that exactly 
match the maturity of assets to be created. Naturally, 
the rate of return on accounts with longer maturities 
would be sufficiently convincing. In contrast, 
conventional finance does not have access to attracting 
restricted Wakala and PLS accounts. 
2. Securitization of long-term projects, portfolios and 
syndicated finance into Sukuk of long maturities to 
attract funds with longer maturities. This enables 
Islamic banks to establish the exact match between 
their assets and liabilities. It is notable that Sukuk 
transfers the title to the securitized assets from banks 
to Sukuk holders, which provides an effective way to 
15 
 
match maturities. Meanwhile, the use of securitization 
of some of their assets by conventional banks does not 
transfer titles to the assets to security holders. 
Conventional banks remain stuck with the titles to their 
assets. Maturity mismatching relief would therefore be 
limited. 
3. Securitizing investment accounts into PLS and 
investment Wakala Sukuk of various maturities in order 
to make them liquid to depositors. Trading investment 
account Sukuk will allow investment account holders to 
exit without deposit withdrawal. This affords the Islamic 
bank an opportunity to turn investment accounts into 
negotiable investment certificates of long maturities 
(that can be sold by their holders before maturity). This 
adds liquidity and flexibility to investment accounts, 
similar to certificates of deposits in conventional 
finance. 
Regulations must therefore set rules for the holders of 
restricted investment accounts in order to allow them 
some monitoring rights with regard to the projects, funds 
or portfolios in which they invest. In addition, proper 
procedures must be set for securitization into Sukuk, in 
order to insure that Sukuk holders control the special 
purpose vehicles and not banks or Sukuk issuers. The 
true sale of securitized assets must be effected in order to 
ascertain their title transfer to Sukuk holders. This would 
effectively remove those assets from banks balance sheets. 
In addition, regulations must set proper rules for trading 
such Sukuk in primary and secondary markets in 
coordination between monetary and financial market 
regulators. 
IV. CREATING A SAFE ASSET.  
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990, 1993) consider banks as an 
optimal security design. Bank deposits provide an 
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investment in a safe asset, which is not affected by 
information in the financial markets and is a feasible, 
efficient asset in optimal portfolio decisions. 
Yet, such security leads to concentration of risk in the 
hands of few specialists, namely bankers. Deposits in 
conventional banks are loans guaranteed both principal 
and interest. Such guarantees influences banks behavior.  
When banks face higher risks, they tend to transfer a 
larger share of risk to their customers through higher 
interest rates (Tovar, Jaramillo and Hernández, 2011). At 
times of crises, the increased vulnerability of the system 
leads banks to fear bank-runs started by one of the banks 
going bankrupt. Their competitive drive is attenuated by 
their interest in protecting their “fellow banks” from 
failure. Financial crises, therefore, reduce banks’ 
incentives to compete, and induce them to use crises as 
coordinating signals for collusion. That is why they are 
capable of raising the interest rates charged to their 
customers. 
The experience of the 2008 international financial crisis 
has clearly shown that the multiple layers of deposit 
guarantees by banks and insurance agencies do not play 
an important role in creating a safe asset. The way 
monetary authorities handled the crisis ended up with 
dipping into taxpayers’ pockets to bail out banks. Safety 
or rather lack of it seems to be intertwined with the 
behavior of bankers, and their inability to resist 
temptation to give in to moral hazard. 
Islamic banks guarantee only demand deposits. The risk 
is fully borne by Islamic banks themselves. Because they 
guarantee the repayment of demand deposits, they allow 
themselves to invest a proportion of them in the PLS asset 
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pool10. Shareholders money and (unrestricted) investment 
deposits are invested side-by-side in that pool. This in turn 
places limits on the risks taken for the whole pool, as 
banks’ shareholders automatically share a part of this 
risk. The tendency to fall into moral hazard is not 
significantly reduced due to the participation of 
shareholders in the Mudaraba pool. As such, banks’ share 
would be a small proportion, leaving the lion’s share to 
investment deposits. 
The behavior of Islamic banks towards bearing risk stands 
in contrast with that of conventional banks. During 
financial crises11, the risk carried by Islamic banks and 
investment account holders increase. Islamic banks do 
not shift part of their risk to investment account holders 
by reducing the profit-sharing ratio assigned to the latter. 
Instead, we find that the rate of return earned by both 
parties becomes lower.  
In order to maintain competitive profit rates on investment 
accounts, Islamic banks may decrease their own profit-
sharing ratio in favor of their customers. Other direct 
cushioning devices are used, like withdrawal from the 
profit stabilization reserve and the investment risk reserve 
in order to prop up the profit rate distributed to 
investment accounts.  
This, however, does not mean that profits distributed to 
investment account holders do not fall during crises. We 
have noticed that such rates did fall significantly during 
the latest international financial crisis. This can be related 
to the exercise of extra care by Islamic banks or the dearth 
                                                 
10 This is the collection of assets in which Islamic banks invest its shareholders’ money 
together with a discretionary proportion of demand deposits and all (unrestricted) investment 
deposits.  
11  Financial crises can strike Islamic finance in mixed financial systems. This can be 
attenuated by the availability of financial assets that facilitate interbank deals among Islamic 
banks. In a purely Islamic finance system, the possibility of crises is removed by the virtue of 
the absence of risk trading and the strong binding of the financial with the real sector.  
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of profitable investment opportunities rather than moral 
hazard.   
Still, there is a need to bar Islamic banks at times of crises 
from shifting risk to their customers and to strengthen the 
banking system against the temptation to moral hazard. 
This may require few steps to be taken by regulators. The 
first step is to make sure that each Islamic bank has 
sufficient resources in the form of direct cushions. Rules 
for setting aside a proportion of profits earned at good 
times to be used in topping up such cushions could be one 
of the ways to do so. 
The second step is to make sure that Islamic banks 
provide a rate of return on investment accounts that is 
higher than the interest rate paid by conventional banks 
on time and saving deposits to compensate investment 
account holders for the extra risk they take in financing 
real economic activities instead of providing collateralized 
loans12. It is rather anomalous, yet common, for Islamic 
banks to pay a rate of return on their investment accounts 
that is not significantly different from the rate of interest 
paid out on conventional deposits. Reasons for such 
phenomenon can be found in the tendency of Islamic 
bankers to mimic the financial products offered by 
conventional banks, after dressing them into an Islamic 
attire. This would lead to the convergence of rates of return 
in both Islamic and conventional banks. 
Perhaps, we can detect some degree of negative moral 
hazard on the side of Islamic banks. Islamic banks may 
have gone too far in mimicking conventional banking by 
evading the tradeoff between risk and return and focusing 
on sale finance, where collateral can be easily obtained. 
                                                 
12 The nominal rate of growth of the economy could be used as a benchmark to the rate of 
return on investment. If an Islamic bank is not distributing the benchmark as a minimum, 
its operations should be scrutinized to check whether the Islamic bank in question is placing 
some of its resources in conventional outlets.   
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Meanwhile, finance based on partnership in product and 
profit may be willfully avoided. This will be dealt with later 
with more regulatory tools, as it involves several other 
ramifications. 
SECTION III: INCENTIVES TO MONITOR AND ASSET 
SAFETY 
Monitoring distinguishes German universal banking from 
Anglo-Saxon commercial banking. It also distinguishes 
conventional from Islamic banking, should Islamic banks 
be true to their own paradigm and act like universal 
banks. Monitoring also distinguishes banking loans, 
which are presumably subject to monitoring from tradable 
debt (bonds) which are not. 
Monitoring can be done in two directions: banks 
monitoring their customers (finance users) and depositors 
or investment-account holders monitoring their banks. 
Optimality requires that monitoring be exercised both 
ways. However, the incentives to monitor are not always 
present on both sides. Obviously, universal banks have a 
greater incentive as well as the effective tools to monitor 
their customers. However, the extent and effectiveness of 
such monitoring has been debatable (Baliga and Polak, 
1995)13. This ultimately depends on the extent to which 
universal banks take equity in the companies to which 
they provide finance. Active membership of universal 
banks in their customers’ boards of directors and the 
degree of their involvement in management sets the 
borders of such monitoring. 
The relationship between universal banks and firms have 
been subject to much scrutiny. Some authors report 
substantial monitoring as old as early Twentieth Century 
                                                 
13 The debate has continued since the date of this article in 1995. See for example, 23.
 Elsas and Krahnen, 2003. 
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(Hilferding, (1910); Riesser (1909)). Fohlin (1993), 
meanwhile, argues that banks representation on boards 
was much lower before 1900. In addition, Edwards and 
Fischer (l994) as well as Edwards and Ogilvie (1995) argue 
that the influence of such boards both past and present 
has been exaggerated. 
This author has previously claimed in other writings that 
universal banks are well placed to monitor their 
customers, based on the presumption that such banks are 
allowed to take equity in the firms to which they provide 
financing in the form of conventional loans. The fact is that 
such assumed practice is not always the case. In many 
cases, German banks sat on firms “supervisory board”, an 
institutional organ that has a vague role, which is different 
from the firm’s “board of directors” that represents equity 
shareholders in the firm and does the actual management, 
(Guinnane, 2001).  We now realize that German banks 
have had a complicated relationship with business and 
cannot simply be assumed to behave like equity-holders 
in customer firms.  
However, our main assertion remains. If a conventional 
bank is allowed to provide finance in the form of equity in 
addition to conventional loans, information asymmetry 
attached to the conventional loan vanishes and the bank 
is automatically freed from the risks of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. The lesson learned from such assertion 
is that universal banking as we perceive it, is an effective 
way to eliminate information asymmetry. Islamic banks 
use 16 finance and investment contracts six of which 
suffer from information asymmetry. The paradigm of 
Islamic banking should therefore include operating like a 
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universal bank that takes equity in the businesses they 
finance14. 
Monitoring is therefore critical to both Islamic and 
conventional banking, simply because it eliminates 
information asymmetry. Such elimination removes the 
risk of adverse selection and moral hazard faced by 
customers providing deposits or investment accounts to 
banks, and by banks providing finance to customers.  
Therefore, we can conclude that the quality of assets held 
by banks through financing activities and of assets held 
by the public through placing deposits or investment 
accounts with banks, depends upon the incentive of banks 
and customers to monitor each other. Optimality requires 
Pareto optimal incentives for banks to screen, monitor and 
invest and for customers to monitor banks with which 
they place funds. With incorrect incentives, market 
failures in the banking industry will occur, reducing social 
welfare and real economic activity (Gertler, 1988). Such 
problem can be remedied with proper regulation as 
explained below.  
I. BANKS AND CUSTOMERS’ INCENTIVES TO 
MONITOR.  
Conventional banks incentives to monitor borrowers do 
not come naturally through the market mechanism. Lack 
of conventional banks’ incentives to monitor emanates 
from their use of the classical loan contract and their 
resulting insistence to limit their risk-taking to the risk on 
collateral. To provide them with incentives to monitor 
requires a radical change in their behavior that would turn 
them to assuming some degree of business risk. 
                                                 
14  We must remember that equity finance is the same as Musharaka and diminishing 
Musharaka, which are two of the Islamic finance sixteen contracts.  
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Holders of demand and time deposits with conventional 
banks have little incentive to monitor their banks, as their 
deposits are guaranteed in principal and interest by banks 
as well as fully or partially insured by deposit insurance 
schemes. They can be induced to monitor their banks only 
if the classical loan contract is no longer the basis for 
providing such deposits and if deposit insurance coverage 
is limited to small deposits.  
In other words, introducing incentives to monitor into 
conventional banking by both banks and deposit holders 
would require systemic changes. This would call for the 
discussion of banking reforms, which is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
The safety of assets held by Islamic banks will generally 
depend on their underlying Islamic finance and 
investment contracts, investment feasibility and 
safeguards to insure transparency and disclosure. 
Islamic banks practices indicate their preference to sale 
over partnership and agency-investment finance. When an 
Islamic bank provides sale finance, it does not give cash 
to customers, but rather purchases merchandise and 
assets and provides them to customer. Only in the case of 
Salam or deferred-delivery sale that cash is advanced 
against later delivery. This means that, except for Salam, 
sale finance includes a self-monitoring mechanism. Sale 
finance is therefore free from information asymmetry and 
requires no extra monitoring beyond its self-monitoring 
mechanism15. 
The choice of the underlying Islamic finance and 
investment contracts provide Islamic banks a unique 
                                                 
15 One exception needs to be mentioned, that regulators must set conditions for the resale of 
financed assets before full finance repayment, in order to make sure that the quality of banks’ 
collateral will not deteriorate due to premature sale, which is usually practiced under 
Tawarruq. We propose as a condition that the new buyer would pay all remaining installments 
in full 
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opportunity to create assets with self-monitoring 
mechanism. There is a menu of sixteen finance and 
investment contracts from which to choose. Each contract 
has a different degree of embedded risk, depending on its 
implicit monitoring. Mixing and matching contracts, or 
what is commonly known as product structuring, can be an 
effective method to sculpture quality assets.  
Joining PLS, Salam or Wakala, which has no self-
monitoring mechanism with Musharaka or diminishing 
Musharaka, with their powerful self-monitoring 
mechanism, in one product would significantly reduce 
information asymmetry and its related risks16.  Risks of 
Musharaka itself can be mitigated through joining it with 
Ijarah. The size of the menu of Islamic investment and 
finance contract indicates that the number of products 
can go into several hundreds.  
To benefit from such advantage may require proper 
regulation. Islamic bankers, interested in short-term 
objectives and being aware of their inability to internalize 
the external benefits of Islamic finance may shy away from 
using certain contracts, particularly those of partnership 
in profit and product, like PLS and Musharaka. Therefore, 
regulators have to make sure that Islamic banks under 
their supervision use the art of product structuring to its 
full potential. 
This can be handled through considering that failure to 
use product structuring effectively can be a source of 
operating risk. Regulations must therefore ascertain that 
each Islamic bank has sufficient resources and proper 
procedures to structure Islamic finance products. In 
addition, supervision should review samples of previously 
                                                 
16 Notice the similarity of this approach with that is supposedly used by universal banks (Al-
Jarhi, 2001), when they actually provide equity finance side-by-side with conventional loans. 
24 
 
structured products to test for their propriety and their 
ability to fulfill customer objectives and bank goals. 
We can therefore conclude that the classical loan contract 
stands as an obstacle against motivating conventional 
bankers and depositors to monitor each other. Such 
motivation requires a systemic change to provide an 
alternative to the classical loan contract. Meanwhile, 
Islamic banks require regulatory discipline to force an 
imaginative effort towards mixing and matching among 
the sixteen available Islamic finance and investment 
contracts.  
II. CUSTOMERS’ INCENTIVES TO MONITOR AND 
ASSET SAFETY 
We mentioned above that customers in their capacity as 
depositors and investment-account holders have little 
incentive to monitor their banks beyond comparing 
interest rates paid by conventional banks on deposits, 
rates of return paid by Islamic banks on investment 
accounts as well as other banking services. This deprives 
customers from early-warning signals indicating the 
imminent collapse of their banks.  
Deposits in conventional finance are defined as loans from 
customers to banks. The conventional loan contract 
makes banks liable to depositors to repay their deposits 
and accrued interest in full. While it is generally 
understood that all loans, albeit in different degrees, are 
subject to default, depositors do not have sufficient 
incentives to continuously assess the default risk of their 
banks. Again, we find that in order to create the proper 
incentives to monitor, customers must place their funds 
with banks on a basis that is different from the classical 
loan contract. This as mentioned above begs the question 
of bank reform. 
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Customers of Islamic banks who deposit their funds in 
investment accounts have a different position. First, their 
investment account is placed on the basis of profit-and-
loss sharing. No guarantee is therefore implicit. Second, 
despite the similarity between the positions of investment-
account holders and bank shareholders, the latter have an 
effective way of monitoring their bank by electing its board 
of directors and looking into their audited financial 
statements every financial year, while the former have no 
way whatsoever. They must therefore rely on the monetary 
authority for monitoring their bank. Past recurrence of 
bank failures indicate that the monetary authority 
monitoring is not sufficient to protect investment account 
holders. 
Regulations must therefore provide the means for 
customers monitoring of banks. The mechanism we 
propose should be similar to that assigned to 
shareholders. That is to insure that depositors would be 
represented in the board of directors in proportion of their 
deposits (or investment accounts) to the total funds 
invested by the bank. In order to do so, we must assign a 
number of seats in the board to depositors. Then, we select 
those who should occupy these seats from the top 
investment-account holders, considering their investment 
account balances and their length to maturity. 
SECTION IV: MARKET FAILURES AND REGULATION 
There are three sources of market failure: the presence of 
public goods, externalities and monopolies (market 
power). 
I. PUBLIC GOODS AND REGULATION 
The banking and finance system itself, once established, 
renders benefits to all users, like the provision of a means 
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of exchange and the use of monetary policy, in order to 
gauge monetary growth to the requirements of economic 
growth and to control inflation. There is no way to apply 
the exclusion principle to all beneficiaries. Of course, 
banks can charge for their services, but cannot charge for 
the benefits from their mere existence. The monetary 
authority itself cannot charge individuals who happen to 
gain from monetary policies.  Taxes must ultimately be 
used to cover the costs of establishing, maintaining, 
regulating the banking system and managing monetary 
policy.  
Does banking and finance in general contain an element 
of public goods that justify its regulation? Would that 
apply equally to both conventional and Islamic finance? 
How would regulation provide a reasonable solution to the 
public good problem in both cases? These are the 
questions into which we would like to look.  
A. THE PUBLIC GOOD ELEMENT IN CONVENTIONAL 
BANKING 
If we excluded the mere existence of the financial system 
as a whole, financing services provided by banks are not 
pure public goods, as the exclusion principle can easily be 
applied to conventional finance. The existence of banking 
complements the institution of money by providing 
monetary services, like accepting deposits, organization of 
payments (transfers, clearance, etc.). Regulation of banks 
preserves the quality of banking services and monetary 
policies preserve the quality of real balance. Such benefits 
are not subject to the exclusion principle and must be 
financed through taxation. 
Conventional finance is provided, based on 
creditworthiness and collateral. In addition, the 
conventional banking system is associated with some 
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public bads. Those result from the use of the classical loan 
contract (Al-Jarhi, 2001).  
 Finance through the classical loan contract causes 
the allocation of resources to be based on “lending 
criteria” rather than “investment criteria” (Al-Jarhi, 
2001). Since the size of the debt to be repaid would 
be subject to cumulative interest, debt can augment 
indefinitely and ultimately become unsustainable. 
The financial sector would experience an enormous 
amount of innovation in the field of risk trading, 
causing it to be remotely connected to and much 
larger in size than the commodity sector, ultimately 
resulting in the lack of compactness of the economic 
system. 
 A conventional bank or financial institution is 
inherently unstable. Its liabilities are guaranteed both 
principal and interest, while its assets are subject to 
default risk. 
 A positive interest rate, guaranteed to be paid, on 
loans encourages the substitution of real resources 
for money in transactions, thereby reducing 
efficiency.  
 Information asymmetry exposes commercial banking 
to risks of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Mitigation of such risks require expensive monitoring 
or the switch from commercial to universal banking 
(Al-Jarhi, 2005).  
 Financial innovations through the use of risk trading 
exposes the economy to instability and contagion. 
 In a democracy with imperfect information, bank size 
becomes a critical element in economic policy, giving 
rise to the claim that some banks are too big to fail. 
Policymakers tend to draw taxpayers’ money to 
subsidize them during crises (Al-Jarhi, 2009). 
28 
 
B. THE PUBLIC GOOD ELEMENTS IN ISLAMIC 
BANKING 
The Islamic banking and finance system would have the 
same elements of public goods as its conventional 
counterpart, namely the provision of a means of exchange 
and monetary policy. In contrast to conventional finance, 
Islamic finance has a much lower share of public bads, as 
seen below. 
 Islamic banking and finance, properly applied 
allocates resources according to investment rather 
than lending criteria. In addition, the size of debt 
(associated with sale finance) would be predetermined 
at the outset and not subject to increase. Debt would 
therefore be sustainable 17 . The financial system 
would be closely connected to and smaller in size than 
the real sector. Therefore, the economic system would 
be compact18.  
 An Islamic bank or financial institution has no 
guaranteed liabilities, with the exception of demand 
deposits. Compared with the presence of risks 
associated with its assets, it appears to be more stable 
than a conventional bank or financial institution. In 
addition, sale finance of assets (provision of 
commodities on credit) automatically provides for 
sufficient collateral. Asset creation by Islamic banks 
would therefore involve an element of risk self-
mitigation that is not automatically available to 
conventional finance. 
 Return on Islamic banks investment accounts is not 
                                                 
17 Temporary insolvent debtors would be provided rescheduling at no extra charge or increase 
in their debt. Only in cases of delinquency, debtors are subjected to penalty fees, which are 
given to charity and not transferable to banks. 
18 We are assuming a monetary structure, where all money issued is placed by the central 
bank into central investment accounts and the central bank has an exclusive monopoly on 
money creation. In addition, banks provide finance only through the sixteen Islamic 
investment and finance contracts Al-Jarhi 1983. See Appendix III. 
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guaranteed, providing no incentive to substitute real 
resources for cash in transactions. The system would 
therefore stay efficient19. 
 Ten out of the sixteen Islamic finance and investment 
contracts enjoy perfect information symmetry 
between finance providers and users. Only PLS, 
Salam and Wakala (restricted and unrestricted) 
contracts are subject to information asymmetry. 
Their use in conjunction with Musharaka would be 
an inexpensive way to provide perfect monitoring. 
 Islamic finance is prohibited from innovating through 
risk trade. Innovation comes as a result of 
introducing new products through mixing and 
matching of the existing sixteen contracts. An 
important source of instability and contagion is 
removed from the financial system, hence. However, 
innovation can lead to finance products of ill repute20. 
They would be instrumental in converging the Islamic 
finance system to conventional finance, thereby 
depriving the former from its important comparative 
advantages. In this respect, we find room for 
regulations to prevent slippage into products of ill 
repute. 
 The rise of large banking units in societies using 
Islamic finance is still possible. Whether this can be 
used to support the claim that such large banks are 
too big to fail, will depend on the game-theoretic 
                                                 
19 When the return on deposits is guaranteed, as in the case of the rate of interest, people are 
tempted to economize on holding cash for transactions purposes by substituting real 
resources for cash in transactions. This brings the economy down to a suboptimal level of 
output. In an Islamic economy, there is no guaranteed return on cash balances. Investment 
accounts are provided on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis. There would be no incentive to 
substitute real resources for cash in transactions. 
20  Islamic finance products of ill repute result when Islamic banks attempt to use 
conventional finance products after dressing them into an Islamic garb, like 'Einah, 
Tawarruq, and products based on the sale of debt. The author coined this term to refer to 
such products that appear Islamic but are truly conventional, or those that fulfill the formal 
validity of the contracts used, but violate the General Objectives of Shari'ah or Maqassed Al-
Shari'ah. 
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structure of the political system21. However, using tax 
money to provide fund users with temporary 
illiquidity during crises through debt rescheduling 
instead of directly subsidizing banks would prove 
more effective in avoiding both recessions and bank 
failures simultaneously. While this coincides with the 
teaching of Islam, it requires regulations to direct the 
regulators’ attention to providing relief to insolvent 
debtors, penalizing the delinquent and prohibiting 
direct subsidies to banks.  
II. REGULATION AND MONITORING 
A. REGULATION AND MONITORING IN CONVENTIONAL 
BANKING. 
Regulation by itself cannot remove the public bads 
described above from the system of conventional banking 
and finance. They turn to be systemic ills that require 
modifying the system. 
Regulation can do little in reducing information 
asymmetry that is associated with the classical loan 
contract. However, regulation can enforce monitoring by 
both conventional banks and their depositors. Since in 
both cases “loaned” cash is provided to one party to use in 
some fashion, monitoring would require some changes in 
the rules of the game. An example would be project 
finance, where regulations would require dividing projects 
into stages and providing loaned cash in installments, 
each disbursed upon the completion of a specific stage22. 
                                                 
21  Whether democracy practiced under Islam (e.g., as in Indonesia, Malaysia, Senegal, 
Tunisia, and Turkey) would also be associated with strong interest groups and large-size 
banks will depend on many political factors that are beyond our scope. However, 
constitutions used as bases for democratic rules in countries where Islamic values are held, 
can be tailored to minimize the influence of interest groups. 
22 Such procedure would be similar to the one used in conjunction with Istisna' contract. 
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However, setting procedures for monitoring finance users 
while using the provided finance would make conventional 
finance cumbersome and costly. This would negate the 
benefits of using the classical loan contract resulting from 
its simplicity. It would of course be better to choose one or 
more Islamic finance contracts that would be free from 
information asymmetry instead of the classical loan 
contract. However, financial innovation has not been 
known to go into that direction. 
As to the monitoring of banks by depositors, a possible 
proposal that depositors would be represented in the 
boards of directors of conventional banks in proportion of 
their deposits to total resources. This can hardly be 
justified, since depositors provide deposits as “loans” 
guaranteed to be repaid both principal and interest.  
In addition, as deposits usually exceed paid up capital by 
many folds, giving depositors a share in bank 
management would change the character of conventional 
banks radically. In itself, such action would be a serious 
institutional change and not merely a regulatory action. 
Generally, banks cannot effectively monitor the finance 
users unless money is not given in cash, but used jointly 
by both banks and customers. This, in turn, would be a 
serious institutional change. 
The conclusion is that regulation itself is not sufficient to 
induce both conventional banks and their customers to 
monitor each other. The optimum amount of monitoring 
in the conventional banking system cannot be reached 
without forsaking the concept of the classical loan 
contract.  
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B. REGULATION AND MONITORING IN ISLAMIC 
BANKING. 
Since Islamic finance does not rely on the classical loan 
contract, it would be easier to fine-tune monitoring to the 
optimum level through regulation. In this regard, 
regulation can help Islamic finance in the following areas: 
1. Placing guidelines for the use of Amana finance, through 
the contracts that provide cash to finance users, 
namely, PLS, Salam and Wakala, in order to facilitate 
their use, in conjunction with Musharaka. Such 
guidelines which have been outlined in section II above, 
would reduce the extent of information asymmetry 
imbedded in PLS and Wakala. 
2. To prevent products of ill repute, regulations must 
clearly define all Islamic finance products and currently 
prevalent non-compliant products (of ill repute)23 and 
establish a Shari'ah supervisory board in the regulatory 
and supervisory agency, while doing away with Shari'ah 
boards in Islamic banks. The presence of a Shari'ah 
board within the regulatory and supervisory agency 
would then be sufficient, once definitions of Islamic 
finance products, permissible and non-permissible, 
have been added to banking, commercial and financial-
market laws. 
3. In line with the above proposal, each Islamic bank can 
maintain a special department for product structuring 
that employs people with proper expertise. The 
department would configure the financing deals 
provided to customers, using a combination of the 
sixteen Islamic finance and investment contracts to 
satisfy customers’ requirements while maintaining 
                                                 
23 It is also important to add such definitions to the banking law, financial markets law and 
civil law to facilitate litigation regarding conflicts between parties involved in Islamic finance 
and to reduce reliance on religious interpretation. 
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economic feasibility. 
4. The meaning of compliance of Islamic finance products 
should be extended to include the non-violation of 
Maqassed Al-Shari'ah or the objectives of Shari'ah, in 
economics. This means that transactions must be valid 
in both form and objectives. Objectives here refer to the 
ultimate consequence of transactions. For example, 
transactions that are formally valid (satisfying the 
required contractual form), can still be non-permissible 
if they lead to unemployment, inflation, instability or 
inequity or violate the ethical standard of Islamic 
investment24. 
C. REGULATION AND SAVING BANKS FROM 
BANKRUPTCY 
Monetary authorities in conventional economic systems 
have been accustomed at times of crises to save banks 
from bankruptcy, usually starting with big banks. The 
reason is the fear that the demise of one bank could trigger 
a domino effect on the whole banking system. Such 
process implies huge transfers from taxpayers to banks’ 
shareholders. In this respect, larger-size banks enjoy a 
higher priority in obtaining such subsidies. Such policy 
often protects banks from bankruptcy. However, it 
provides no protection to the economy from recession, as 
banks during times of crises have relatively conservative 
lending policies.  
In Islamic banking, the protection of banks from 
bankruptcy remains a legitimate objective. However, 
Islamic banks, properly managed, ought to show more 
resilience than conventional banks. This is due to the 
different nature of their balance sheets. While Islamic 
banks assets are subject to investment hazards, their 
                                                 
24 Such standards include in addition to dealing in interest, risk trading and cheating, human 
trafficking and inflicting harm on life or environment. 
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liabilities are not guaranteed because investment 
accounts are usually based on PLS or profit-and-loss 
sharing, PLS.  
Regulations can prohibit providing direct subsidies to 
banks that face bankruptcy risks. Instead, they should 
offer assistance to customers who face temporary 
insolvency at times of crises in the form of rescheduling. 
In addition, they should impose substantial penalties on 
delinquent finance users25. 
At times of crises, subsidizing banks to prevent their 
bankruptcy would not encourage them to keep providing 
financing economic activities at the same pace. Reduction 
in financing would push the economy down into recession. 
However, if insolvent borrowers obtained rescheduling 
breaks, they would be able to repay their debt, albeit at a 
longer period and with lower rates of return to banks. 
Aggregate spending will not be seriously affected, banks 
will not face bankruptcy and the economy will not fall into 
recession (Al-Jarhi 2008). 
Obviously, such proposal will involve no wealth 
redistribution between tax payers and banks 
shareholders. To the contrary, banks shareholders may 
face a slightly lower rates of return because of forced 
rescheduling on temporarily insolvent customers.   
SECTION V: RELATED ISSUES OF MONETARY 
POLICY 
I. FORCED WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION. 
                                                 
25 The distinction between temporary insolvency and delinquency is central to this proposal. 
Temporary insolvency can be perceived as a shortage of present cash that prevents debtors 
from meeting their payment obligations. Delinquency implies an intentional refusal to pay 
one’s financial obligations in order to spend the currently available cash on something else.  
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In conventional finance, banks as monopolies are 
implicitly allowed by law to create money collectively in the 
form of derivative deposits. Such a permission is granted 
by default through the fractional reserve system. The 
process of money creation through derivative deposits is a 
result of collective behavior and not that of a single bank.  
Such money creation imposes an externality on the non-
banking public. Money collectively created by banks is lent 
to customers at an interest rate. Charging interest on 
lending is rationalized by the fact that money has 
transactions services. Yet, such services emanate from the 
fact that money is generally accepted as means of 
exchange by the public26.  
Since the public is the source of general acceptability, it 
should earn any return resulting therefrom. Nonetheless, 
such reward, which is the source of monyness, does not 
go to the public. It goes to banks instead. Therefore, 
conventional banks force a redistribution of wealth to their 
favor through their creation and lending of money in the 
form of derivative deposits. 
The provision of the money issued by banks as interest-
bearing loans imposes another externality. The underlying 
classical loan contract suffers from information 
asymmetry and imposes on the whole society extra risks 
of adverse selection and moral hazard. Such risks 
ultimately lead to an aggregate level of output below 
optimum. As explained above, risk-sharing would be a 
better arrangement for the whole economy. However, lack 
of coordination between economic agents forces them to 
stick to continue to use the interest-rate mechanism. 
                                                 
26 Notably, outside money issued by the monetary authority (the monetary base) is usually a 
small fraction of the money supply. Banks collectively can create a multiple of the monetary 
base in terms of derivative deposits. The wealth redistributed from the public to banks’ 
shareholders is proportionately high. 
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Regulation has only one way to internalize such 
externalities to the benefit of the whole society. Regulators, 
through the enforcement of total reserves, give the 
monopoly of issuing money total and complete to the 
monetary authority.  
In both of an Islamic and a conventional economy, the 
application of the total reserve system prevents wealth 
redistribution from the public to banks’ shareholders. 
However, it will not insure against information asymmetry 
in a conventional economy. In both Islamic and 
conventional economies, the total reserve system may not 
be sufficient. Guidelines must be set on the proper 
disposal of seigniorage gained by the monetary authority.   
II. FORCED HIDDEN TAXATION 
In conventional banking, the monetary authorities issue 
the monetary base against government debt. The interest 
paid by the government to the monetary authority on its 
debt returns to the government in the form of monetary 
authority surplus. This means that the government 
obtains free financial resources at the expense of the 
whole society. The cost of such resources would be 
equivalent to a hidden tax that facilitates government 
sector expansion at the expense of the private sector. The 
tax would be approximately equal to the resulting increase 
in the rate of inflation. This is similar to the crowding-out 
effect that is accompanied by an inflation tax. 
It is notable in this regard that the expansion of the public 
sector through borrowing from the monetary authority is 
a political decision that more often than not does not 
satisfy the efficiency criteria. The crowding-out effect 
would ultimately imply an element of inefficiency; unless 
competition is assured between the public and the private 
sectors, the allocation of resources will remain 
suboptimal. 
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We can therefore propose that the expansion of the public 
sector by political decisions should be limited to activities 
that cannot be provided at a price, i.e., for which the 
exclusion principle cannot be applied. Moreover, 
government activities that can be provided under the 
exclusion principle should compete with those provided by 
the private sector on equal basis. Such competition can be 
assured when government activities of this type are 
financed through banks, where banks allocate financial 
resources among different activities using economic-
feasibility criteria.   
Additionally, transparency rules can be introduced. 
Government budget should add all items of seigniorage to 
“non-tax revenues” for which the government would be 
accountable. For the sake of transparency, such items 
should not be lumped together in one figure but duly 
itemized. 
As to public goods, where the exclusion principle cannot 
be applied, taxation (with representation) would be used. 
In addition, the establishment of Awqaf, the collection and 
disbursement of Zakah and other charities should be 
facilitated, in order to lessen the need for government 
provision of public services.  
III. HOW THE NEWLY ISSUED MONEY IS USED 
Some may argue for giving all monetary balances issued 
by the monetary authority to the government in the form 
of interest-free loans. This begs the question of how to 
allocate economic activities between the public and the 
private sectors. Efficiency may require the use of market 
mechanism jointly with democratic political rules for such 
a division. Providing the government with free monetary 
balances may bias such resource allocation at the outset 
in favor of the public sector. 
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We have to find a different way to dispose of the newly 
issued monetary balances, whose issue and allocation to 
different uses can be based on efficiency criteria and not 
merely lending criteria. Al-Jarhi’s model (1981) has two 
distinct proposals in this regard.  
First: the monetary authority should follow up the real 
growth of the economy and gauge any issued (or 
destroyed) money to the monetary requirements of real 
growth. The reason is rather obvious. Growth indicates 
higher output, requiring a larger size of transactions to 
produce and trade the expanded volume of goods and 
services. When more transactions are required, more 
monetary balances would also be required to conclude the 
necessary transactions, if the rate of inflation is to remain 
constant. 
How much more money should be issued to support a rise 
in real growth by one percent? This question can be 
answered by the close follow-up of how the rate of inflation 
responds to a higher rate of monetary expansion. The 
monetary authority would learn from experience and 
discover how to gauge monetary expansion to the 
transactions requirements of growth, without causing 
inflation27.  
Second, Al-Jarhi’s model proposes a different way to 
dispose of monetary balances. In this model, the monetary 
authority adds to the total money supply by issuing money 
and placing it in investment (deposits) accounts with 
banks. Such central deposits would be allocated among 
banks according to efficiency criteria, where banks that 
are more profitable would obtain relatively higher 
proportions of central deposits. Perhaps the monetary 
                                                 
27 Notice that in this model, the issue of money would not be politically influenced and price 
stability would be assigned a higher priority than it obtains in a conventional economy. In 
addition, monetary-policy makers would have more power to control both monetary 
expansion and the rate of inflation, as they hold absolute monopoly on the production of 
money, rendering it the highest degree of independence from political influences. 
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authority would attempt to equate the rate of return from 
its central deposits in different banks at the margin. 
In the absence of fractional reserves and the discount 
window, and in order to provide a financial instrument to 
serve as a tool for monetary policy, the monetary authority 
can issue central deposit certificates, CDC’s as financial 
instruments, which both banks and the public can hold 
and trade. Such equity-based instruments can be used as 
a tool to change the money supply through open market 
operations, and to provide banks with temporary liquidity 
as part of the monetary authority function of acting as a 
last-resort provider of liquidity to banks. 
The monetary authority would gain profits from placing its 
own central deposits with Islamic banks and acting as a 
first-tier Mudareb for the proceeds of central deposit 
certificates. This would be considered seigniorage whose 
disposal would be subject to transparency rules. The 
monetary authority surplus is balanced by banks’ 
providing finance both to the government and to the 
private sector through market mechanism on equal 
terms28. 
IV. THE MARKET MECHANISM 
In comparison with the banking sector in an Islamic 
economy, the conventional banking system has some 
distinct characteristics. Banks gain monopoly power 
through licensing. In addition, the banking system 
becomes a price setter, as the monetary authorities set the 
                                                 
28 An important aspect of the Islamic economy is that social action determines the size of the 
public sector. Redistribution of wealth is done yearly through the levy of Zakah on those 
whose wealth exceed a certain limit. The redistributive branch of the economy can be privately 
managed but government controlled. Awqaf (or charitable foundations) can be established to 
provide for many public services, including health and education. The size of the public sector 
will be influenced by the extent to which the public is interested in providing public services 
through Awqaf, which has a special religious significance, but unfortunately, its role has been 
curtailed by modern governments in the Islamic world.  In other words, an Islamic economy 
would be less encumbered with a government-budget deficit. 
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rates of interest, which are used as bases for pricing loans. 
Conventional banks income on lending comes from the 
interest differential that may not change much with the 
level of interest rates set by the monetary authority29. The 
cost of funds is not therefore, market determined. This 
introduces an element of inefficiency to the finance 
system. 
Lifting the monetary authority control on interest rates in 
a conventional economy would not be acceptable. Interest 
rates are considered an important policy tool that 
monetary authorities would not conceivably yield. 
In Islamic banking and finance, funds are provided 
through the provision of goods and services on credit as 
well as through partnerships and investment agency. The 
rate of return on financing is market determined. 
Monetary policy is exercised exclusively through changing 
the monetary base and by open market operations in 
Islamic financial instruments.  
Investment certificates, or as currently known as Sukuk, 
properly defined, can be issued in this economy by 
Treasury to obtain financing for its own projects. The 
monetary authority issues its own Sukuk as mentioned 
above. Banks and business enterprises can also issue 
their own Sukuk as a means to obtain financing through 
financial markets. 
It is theoretically possible that the monetary authority 
would attempt to set the rates of return on these Sukuk 
(markup, rental and profit rates) through open market 
operations in each kind of certificates. This would be too 
                                                 
29 Banks would put a markup on the central bank or prime rate to calculate the borrowing 
rates paid on deposits. They add the interest rate differential to the borrowing rate in order 
to arrive at the lending rate. Assisted by monopoly power, banks could set the interest rate 
differential as a percentage of the central bank or prime rate. Raising that rate under this 
scenario would mean a higher differential in absolute terms. The total income from bank 
lending will ultimately depend on its volume. 
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laborious. The control of money supply would require 
trading certain value of certificates for each targeted level 
of monetary base. Selective trading by underlying 
contracts would not be necessary. We claim that the 
Sukuk markets for different funding outlets are 
sufficiently segmented to make government control of their 
rate of return impossible. 
One of the important aspects of the Islamic monetary 
system is its reliance on the market mechanism. This is 
an advantage that should not be lost against temptations 
to interfere in the market. Regulation can enforce the 
competitiveness of Islamic banking and finance by 
reducing restrictions on entry and complete avoidance of 
setting rates of return on either investment accounts or 
financing provided by banks. 
SECTION VI: AGGREGATE LIQUIDITY 
I. LIQUIDITY DEFINITION 
Monetary economists look at liquidity as a spectrum of 
assets, with currency on the top, followed by demand 
deposits, time deposits, government securities, corporate 
securities and so on. The first layer usually included 
currency and demand deposits, or M1. The second layer 
includes saving and time deposits, or quasi money. Both 
layers are added together of form domestic liquidity or M2. 
In Islamic finance, currency, demand deposits and 
investment accounts hold similar liquidity connotations. 
M1 would be equal to currency plus demand deposits and 
M2 would be equal to M1 plus investment accounts. 
The big difference lies in the rest of government and 
corporate securities. In Islamic finance, there are no 
interest-bearing securities issued by economic agents. 
Sukuk represent titles to combinations of assets, fully 
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owned by their holders under real sale. The process of 
Islamic finance allows banks to create derivative deposits 
as well as derivative investment accounts. We have argued 
above for the enforcement of total reserves against 
demand deposits, while the public and banks to 
collectively create liquidity in the form of investment 
deposits. 
II. COST OF LIQUIDITY  
Aggregate liquidity is the responsibility of the monetary 
authority. It justifies its monopoly over money creation 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). This assigns the systemic 
stability role to the monetary authority. 
The need for the monetary authority to regulate the 
financial sector comes from the role played by 
conventional banks in asset transformation. They have 
illiquid assets and allegedly liquid liabilities. While 
economists consider deposits as money, Fama (1980) 
asserts that bank deposits are not liquid, but they are 
private contracts with different levels of risk. This must be 
taken with the fact that investment accounts are not the 
parallel product to time and saving deposits. They are 
based on PLS. They can also be based on Musharaka and 
Wakala. Therefore, the concept of asset transformation 
takes a different twist in Islamic banking. 
The role of the monetary authority, as a regulator and as 
responsible for aggregate liquidity may be different in the 
case of Islamic finance. Such responsibility will usually be 
influenced by whether banks are allowed to produce 
collectively derivative deposits through the imposition of 
fractional reserves.  
In addition, the “liquidity” created by Islamic banks may 
have a different effect on the price level due to the fact that 
Islamic finance, unlike conventional finance, does not 
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finance the demand side only. In partnership-in-product 
and in-profit, Islamic banks finance the supply side, which 
ultimately influences demand to the extent of payments to 
factors of production. Sale finance, meanwhile, extends 
finance to both the demand and supply sides 
simultaneously. In both cases, the effect of the demand 
increase on price is attenuated by preceding or parallel 
effect of an increase in supply. In addition, Islamic banks 
do not finance risk trade, which could represent an 
important leakage from the commodity to the financial 
sector. 
Finally, the regulation of Islamic banking based on 
“supervising liquidity” would require the regulator or the 
monetary authority to act as the ultimate “fund provider”, 
a role that is parallel to that of the “ultimate lender” in 
conventional banking. We will take up each one of the 
three points below. 
III. DERIVATIVE DEPOSITS AND DERIVATIVE 
INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
When an Islamic bank provides sale finance, it acquires 
merchandize and assets from suppliers which it provides 
to customers against future payment. In the instance 
when the bank acquires merchandize or assets to be 
grown or manufactured for future delivery against present 
payment, the bank credits their countervalue to the 
sellers’ accounts. In addition, when it provides 
Musharaka, PLS or Wakala finance, it places some of the 
capital provided as a demand deposit into the finance 
user’s account30. Therefore, finance users receive cash 
only when they are not getting their finance in kind.  
                                                 
30 When a bank provides some or all capital in kind (e. g. land, machinery and equipment), it 
will make payments to the suppliers of the physical capital. 
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Finance users, once received the funds, start spending on 
their investment activities to purchase factors of 
production. The cash flows therefrom to the owners of 
such factors will restart another cycle of flows to banks. In 
the other instances where Islamic banks provide sale 
finance, cash is added to the demand deposits of 
commodity suppliers. 
If all such flows or most of them end up with Islamic 
banks 31 , it provides another cycle of financing to its 
customers, thereby creating derivative investment-
accounts and derivative demand-deposits with them. 
Banks will use some of the new balances placed in 
investment accounts to finance more assets in the 
Mudaraba pool. New balances in demand deposits will be 
similarly used. The proportion of the new balances used 
to create new investment depends on the required reserve 
ratio applied on such accounts and deposits. This will 
cause successive rounds of derivative products both as 
investment accounts and as demand deposits. 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF MONEY CREATION BY 
ISLAMIC BANKS ON PRICES 
From above, we realize that Islamic banks are capable, as 
a group, of adding to the supply of money through 
derivative deposits. Banks use balances over and above 
their liquidity as well as reserve requirements, if any, to 
invest and add to their assets. 
Islamic banks invest through providing finance in the 
forms of partnership, Wakala, or sale finance. In 
partnership cases, finance goes to increase the supply of 
commodities. In sale finance, the bank acquires 
merchandized and assets from suppliers first and then sell 
                                                 
31 In a multiple finance system (conventional and Islamic), some funds will flow out of Islamic 
into conventional banks and vise versa. 
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them to customers, stimulating supply and then demand. 
The time delay between supply and demand stimulation 
depends on whether the bank acquires merchandize and 
asset already in inventory or commands their production, 
as in Istisna'.  
In conclusion, the increase in Islamic finance investments 
due to the increase in money supply in the form of 
derivative investment-accounts and derivative demand-
deposits would have no significant effect on inflation. This 
is contrary to conventional finance which is mostly 
directed to demand and can easily be inflationary. 
We might add in this respect, that Islamic banks, when 
properly regulated, should be prohibited from financing 
risk-trade transactions, e. g., speculation in the stock 
market or trading in derivatives 32 . This would be an 
additional measure to prevent money created by Islamic 
banks to lead to inflation and/or instability. 
In contrast, conventional finance provides financial 
resources to those who trade in risk. Risk trading is done 
mostly for gambling purposes. It hits the economy from 
time to time with instability and contagion. Risk trading 
redistributes wealth haphazardly, and could influence 
consumption demand directly. 
The phenomenon of collective money creation by 
conventional banks and its effect on the price level, the 
cost of real balances and wealth redistribution against the 
public and in favor of banks would all justify regulations 
in favor of total reserves. However, collective money 
creation by Islamic banks may have less influence on the 
price level and the cost of real balances, but would still 
have the same redistributive effects in favor of banks. The 
                                                 
32  This brings up the question of regulating financial markets under Islamic finance. 
Obviously, there are several ways of preventing speculation in stocks and trading in 
derivatives. What concerns us here is that Islamic banks regulations should block any 
attempts of Islamic banks to finance speculative or risk-trade transactions. 
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enforcement of total reserves would still be in order. 
Meanwhile, more transparency is required in the 
government use of seigniorage.       
V. THE ULTIMATE LIQUIDITY PROVIDER 
Should the monetary authority claim final responsibility 
for the aggregate liquidity of the economy, it must stand 
ready to play the role of the last liquidity provider to banks. 
However, the role of the lender of the last resort does not 
seem to apply equally to Islamic banking. The reason is 
that most monetary authorities regulating and supervising 
Islamic banks in a mixed financial system do not have the 
tools to act as the ultimate liquidity provider to Islamic 
banks.  
Monetary authorities perform the function of the ultimate 
lender through a single conventional means, namely, the 
discount window; banks requiring extra liquidity can 
discount some of their government-debt holdings. This 
would not be acceptable for Islamic banks.  The alternative 
is that the government or monetary authorities issue 
Islamic investment certificates (e.g., Mudaraba 
certificates) whose proceeds are invested either directly or 
through Islamic banks. Banks holding such certificates 
would sell them in the open market or to the monetary 
authority to obtain liquidity relief. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Islamic banking dependence on mixing and matching 
between sixteen contracts may appear to bankers, 
originally trained in conventional banking, as 
cumbersome and costly. Yet, it has several advantages 
over conventional finance especially in the areas of 
information asymmetry, efficiency, stability and debt 
sustainability. Most of such advantages are reflected as 
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external effects in the form of macroeconomic and long-
run benefits. Islamic bankers, failing to internalize such 
benefits, have little incentive to adhere strictly to the 
Islamic finance paradigm. To the contrary, they have every 
incentive to mimic conventional finance, with a view to 
reduce costs and streamline operations. Regulations are 
therefore required to change such behavior in a way to 
allow the economy to reap the benefits of Islamic finance.  
Regulation that ignores the special characteristics of 
Islamic finance would hinder the growth of Islamic banks 
and deprive them from their comparative advantage in 
handling finance relative to conventional banking. Worse 
still, such regulation would lead Islamic banks to slip 
gradually into the practices of conventional finance, 
ultimately forcing one-sided convergence between Islamic 
and conventional finance. Islamic finance would then lose 
its raison d’être and become totally meaningless. 
Regulatory and supervisory authorities must seriously 
consider how differently Islamic banks handle market 
imperfections in order to design their proper regulation. 
Both Islamic and conventional banks benefit from 
economies of scale in screening customers.  However, 
Islamic banks have a comparative advantage in screening 
the seekers of sale finance, because of the absence of 
information asymmetry. Regulation of Islamic banks must 
verify the existence of proper procedures to offer sale 
finance and to ascertain the use of financed commodities 
and their availability as collateral until the finance is fully 
repaid. 
Screening investors seeking finance by Islamic banks 
requires procedures to verify investment feasibility. 
Regulation must ascertain that Islamic banks have the 
capability and resources to perform such function. 
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Regulation must insure that banks properly monitor their 
customers and depositors and investment account holders 
monitor their banks. Islamic banks face no information 
asymmetry in sale and Musharaka finance. The 
monitoring problem is automatically solved, hence. 
Monitoring partnership finance through PLS and Wakala 
requires procedures to make it less costly. The paper offers 
such procedures. 
Investment account holders in Islamic banks must 
monitor their banks because their accounts, unlike 
demand deposits, are not guaranteed. Regulations must 
allow for proportionally representing investment account 
holders on the board of directors of Islamic banks in order 
to reduce the risk of moral hazard. Regulation must set 
minimum size and maturity requirements for the 
representation of account holders. 
Both Islamic and conventional banks face maturity 
mismatch between assets and liabilities. Islamic banks 
have more tools than conventional banks to close this gap. 
Regulations must therefore make sure that Islamic banks 
use such tools to the extent that maturity mismatch 
becomes negligible.  
Conventional banks face greater instability than Islamic 
banks. Time and saving deposits in conventional banks 
are guaranteed, both principal and interest. Risk is 
therefore concentrated in the hands of conventional 
banks. They tend to shift back this risk to customers at 
times of crises, by charging higher margins on loans. This 
behavior includes a higher degree of coordination between 
banks at times of crises. 
Islamic banks, meanwhile, share risk in proportion to 
their shareholders’ equity. Investment account holders 
face risk in proportion to their account balances. Risk is 
therefore distributed more uniformly in Islamic finance. 
49 
 
Islamic banks use the profit stabilization reserve and the 
investment risk reserve as cushions during times of low 
profits in order to pay a competitive rate of return on 
investment accounts.  
Regulation must ascertain the buildup of sufficient 
cushions during good times and their proper use during 
adversity. They must also make sure that the rate of 
return on investment accounts is sufficiently higher than 
the interest rate paid on time and saving deposits, to 
compensate for the higher risk taken in financing real 
economic activities rather than providing collateralized 
loans. 
While regulation must provide Islamic banks with 
procedures to tighten their monitoring of PLS and Wakala 
investment, the quality of their assets hinges upon 
product structuring in order to benefit from the risk 
mitigation advantages of the majority of Islamic finance 
and investment contracts. Regulation must therefore 
make sure that banks internal processes include product 
structuring. Product structures must be tested internally 
for both business viability and compliance.  
Regulation can help Islamic finance deal with the public 
goods problem. It can set guidelines for the use of Amana 
finance (PLS and Wakala) in order to facilitate their use in 
conjunction with Musharaka. In order to prevent the 
products of ill repute, regulations must clearly define all 
permissible and non-permissible products and add their 
definitions in the relevant laws. The regulator must 
establish a Shari'ah supervisory board in the regulatory 
agency, while doing away with Shari'ah boards in each 
Islamic bank 
Regulations can prohibit providing subsidies to Islamic 
banks that face bankruptcy risks. Instead, regulators 
should offer assistance to customers who face temporary 
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insolvency. In addition, heavy penalties should be 
imposed on delinquent customers.    
In Islamic finance, the government would have to compete 
with the private sector in order to obtain finance for its 
economic activities from Islamic banks using the Islamic 
finance and investment contracts. The monetary authority 
seigniorage is balanced by providing finance to the 
government through market mechanism on equal basis 
with the private sector and enforcing transparency and 
disclosure rules on the seigniorage use by Treasury. 
The role of the monetary authority to protect aggregate 
liquidity depends on whether banks are allowed to 
produce collectively derivative investment-accounts and 
demand-deposits through the imposition of fractional 
reserves. The “liquidity” created by Islamic banks may 
have a different effect on the price level due to the fact that 
Islamic finance does not finance the demand side only, but 
extends its finance to both the demand and supply sides. 
Finally, the regulation of Islamic banking based on 
“supervising liquidity” would require the regulator or the 
monetary authority to properly equip itself to act as the 
ultimate “liquidity provider”; a role that is parallel but not 
similar to that of the “ultimate lender” in conventional 
banking.  
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APPENDIX I: DEBT PREDICTABILITY, AN 
ILLUSTRATION 
I. UNPREDICTABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL DEBT 
Under conventional finance debt has no predictable 
maturity. The outstanding value of debt at the ith period, 
or Di is equal to the amount borrowed B minus the amount 
paid out until the ith period, or Pi. In other words: 
Di = B - Pi         (1) 
Debt service payment at the end of the period (i) is equal 
to the amount outstanding multiplied by the rate of 
interest prevailing at ith period: 
஽೔
ሺேି௜ሻ 	ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ	         (2) 
Quite often, the borrower could fall into arrears. When this 
happens, banks add a penalty margin to the current rate 
of interest and apply it to the whole outstanding balance. 
This means that the debt service due in the ith period is 
equal to: 
஽೔
ሺேି௜ሻ 	ሼ1 ൅ ሺݎ௜ ൅ ݌௜ሻሽ	        (3) 
The total value of debt service for a borrowed amount that 
is equal to D, is equal to the sum of debt service payments 
between 1 and N., or 
∑ ஽೔ሺேି௜ሻ	ሼ1 ൅ ሺݎ௜ ൅ ݌௜ሻሽ	ே௜ୀଵ                 (4) 
The total amount of debt service would be known only if 
N, rate of interest prevailing during each period until 
maturity and the penalty interest margin are known. In 
most cases, none of the three parameters is known, which 
makes the value of debt service rather unpredictable. 
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Added to this that interest is compounded every period, 
which can be augmented by the penalty margin, the value 
of outstanding debt can continue to increase, while the 
amount of service payment can equal several multiples of 
the borrowed amount. 
II. PREDICTABILITY OF DEBT UNDER ISLAMIC 
FINANCE 
In Islamic finance, the amount of finance is the same as 
the amount to be paid. In other words, the total amount 
due is equal to the base amount (ܤ଴	,cost in Murabaha or 
spot price in case of deferred payment sale) plus the 
markup (ܤଵ). The sum of both are divided into equal or 
unequal installments, to be paid over a certain number of 
periods, N. 
ܤ ൌ	ܤ଴	 ൅	ܤଵ ൌ 	∑ ܤ௜ே௜ୀଵ         (5) 
All the debt parameters are set from the beginning and the 
debtor is perfectly certain about their values. Should the 
debtor run into temporary illiquidity, he will be granted 
(subject to proving his case) free rescheduling. There will 
be no penalty rates to apply and consequently no increase 
in the debt value. 
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APPENDIX II: DEFINITIONS OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
AND INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 
I. PARTNERSHIP IN PRODUCT  
Partnership in product started as a way to finance 
agriculture through joint ventures. Partners share inputs 
and product according to a pre-agreed formula. 
A. MUZARA’A 
A contract between a proprietor and a farmer, where the 
first provides a piece of arable land and the farmer 
provides farming labor. Working capital can be provided 
by either party or both in agreed proportion. Product is 
shared in an agreed proportion. 
B. MUGHARASSA 
A contract between an owner of arable land and a farmer, 
where the former provides a piece of land and the latter 
undertakes to plant the same with a certain number of 
fruit and/or lumber trees of specific types. In return, the 
farmer earns the title to a share of the land planted with 
trees.  
C. MUSSAQAH 
A contract between an orchard owner and a farmer, where 
the first provides an orchard planted with trees producing 
fruit or lumber and the second provides farming labor. The 
second party takes care of irrigating, pruning and caring 
for the trees in return of a share in fruit or lumber. 
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II. PARTNERSHIP IN PROFIT 
Partnership finance is similar to equity finance in the 
conventional sense. Partners share profit according to a 
pre-agreed formula. However, sharing loss is strictly 
according to shareholding. 
A. MUSHARAKA 
A contract between two or more partners who provide 
capital and share management and profit in a joint 
venture. The objectives of the venture, the proportions of 
shareholding and profit sharing ratios are set from the 
beginning. Loss is shared according the capital shares. 
Shareholders can participate in management either 
directly or through delegation. 
B. MUSHARAKA MUTANAQISSA (DIMINISHING 
MUSHARAKA) 
A joint venture of a limited period, where capital shares 
are extinguished over a prespecified number of years, 
during which one of or more of the partners buy the shares 
of others who have agreed to exit at the end.  
C. UNRESTRICTED MUDARABA 
Mudaraba itself is a partnership in profit, between 
Rabbulmal (the financier) who provides capital, but does 
not participate in management and the Mudareb (investor) 
provides investment management. Profit is shared 
according to pre-agreed proportions. In cases of loss, the 
financier loses some or all of his capital and the investor 
loses investment effort.  
This contract has been customarily used by Islamic banks 
to attract deposits (investment accounts). 
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D. RESTRICTED MUDARABA  
In this form of Mudaraba, the activities of the Mudareb 
(investor) are restricted in the contract. Restrictions can 
be placed on goods to be traded, sector, countries, in 
which to invest, etc. 
E. DIMINISHING MUDARABA 
The bank supplies the Mudareb with financial resources 
on Mudaraba basis, with a stipulation that they would be 
extinguished gradually over a certain number of periods. 
III. SALE FINANCE 
Sale finance is a means through which the financier 
purchases and possesses goods and services including 
assets and sells them to a finance user for a price that 
includes a premium over cost. 
A. MURABAHA 
This the most common mode of finance used by Islamic 
banks. It is a contract in which the finance user signs a 
promise to purchase certain goods at prespecified cost-
plus price. Based on the promise, the financier acquires 
and possesses the same goods and then sells them as 
agreed to the finance user. 
B. BAI' BETHAMAN AJEL 
It is a contract through in which the financier sells goods 
in his or her possession for a negotiated price to the 
finance user.  
C. ISTISNA' 
It is a contract through which the financier commands the 
finance user to manufacture certain goods, usually not 
readily available in the market, and pays the price to the 
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manufacturer wholly or partly in advance of, during or 
after manufacturing. The manufacturer may do the 
manufacturing himself or through a third party 
D. SALAM 
Salam is a contract through which a financier purchases 
merchandize that is readily available in the market for 
future delivery and pays the seller the price spot. One of 
the advantages of this contract is to facilitate the financing 
of agricultural crops. 
E. IJARAH 
Ijarah is a contract in which the financier sells the 
usufruct of a property whose title or title to its usufruct 
he/she holds. Ijarah can also be used with services, like 
education, travel, etc. The finance user buys the usufruct, 
pays for it periodically or the services, and pays for them 
in installments. 
F. IJARAH MUNTAHIA BETTAMLEEK 
Ijarah Muntahia Bettamleek is a contract in which the 
financier sells the usufruct of a fixed asset (e.g., a real 
estate) and allows the buyer (finance user) to purchase the 
title to a portion of the asset every year. After an agreed 
period, the title to the whole asset ends with the finance 
user. 
IV. INVESTMENT AGENCY 
A. UNRESTRICTED WAKALA 
Unrestricted Wakala is a contract through which a fund 
owner (principal) authorizes an investment expert to 
invest the funds provided in profitable placements. The 
agent obtains a commission regardless of the investment 
results. In addition, the contract may stipulate a profit 
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share for the agent, as an incentive, when the profit rate 
reaches a certain hurdle rate. 
B. RESTRICTED WAKALA 
Restricted Wakala may include restrictions on the 
investment activities exercised by the agent that would 
limit activities to certain assets, sectors, geographic 
locations, etc.   
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